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Abstract: In his article "Blanchot and Ambiguity" Paolo Bartoloni investigates the enigmatic and ambiguous turn of the famous Blanchotian statement "existence without Being." The intention of the article is to locate Blanchot's remark in the context of a discussion on history and its possible end, famously initiated by Alexandre Kojève in a lecture on 4 December 1937 at the College of Sociology in
Paris; and provide insights into the difference that distinguishes Kojève's reflection on the end of history, Bataille's subsequent interpretation of it, and Blanchot's original conceptualization of a state of
being suspended between nature and culture, history and the end of history. The theoretical discussion is enhanced by the innovative relation that Bartoloni draws between Blanchot's notion of "existence without Being" and one of Antonioni's most significant but also enigmatic films, The Eclipse.
Bartoloni focuses his attention on The Eclipse's last seven minutes, producing an interpretation which
is simultaneously a concrete example of Blanchot's theory but also a critical contribution to Antonioni
studies.
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Paolo BARTOLONI
Blanchot and Ambiguity
In a well-known and often quoted passage of The Work of Fire (1995) (La Part du feu [1949]), Maurice Blanchot introduces a notion that continues to perplex and challenge us: he speaks of an "existence without being" (Work 334) ("existence sans l'être" [La Part 336]). This concept is interesting for
many different reasons, but especially because it resonates with literary and philosophical preoccupations which are central to Western thought, including a major current of contemporary philosophical
speculation also known as biopolitics. My primary interest in this article is to follow Blanchot closely as
he brings his extremely mobile and malleable language and thought to bear on the idea of "existence
without being," relates "existence without being" to a series of parallel literary and philosophical conceptualizations, and provides a possible example of "existence sans l'être" through a discussion of the
last seven minutes of Michelangelo Antonioni's film The Eclipse (L'Eclisse, 1962).
The coupling of "existence" and "being" through the preposition "without" is simultaneously puzzling and seductive. The puzzlement derives from finding a separation where a conjunction is expected. It is not only Bishop Berkeley who would object to this idea, stressing that there simply cannot
be existence without being. Even Christian cosmology, as well as idealism and metaphysics, would
have trouble in accepting, let alone coming to terms with, such a notion. In fact, the very foundations
of Western thought rest on the belief that "existence" is "being" and that "being" is "existence." How is
it possible to contemplate an existence in the absence of being? Of course, it all depends on what one
means by "being" and "existence." The seduction stems from the boldness of the formula which deliberately separates what ought to be inseparable. And yet, this separation is only apparent; it is only a
separation managed by grammatical rules. As a matter of fact, "existence" and "being" are still facing
each other, although across the distance of a "without." One could say that their separation is brought
about by their mutual belonging, and that they are together through being separate. On the page and
to the eye, they still appear as conjoined. The odd linking of "existence" and "being" by "without" pulls
us in different directions, creating a degree of ambiguity of meaning, which we are not about to resolve but rather to expose.
The context of Blanchot's "existence sans l'être" is the essay "Literature and the Right to Death"
("La Littérature et le droit à la mort"). Towards the end of the essay, Blanchot argues that, while literature (the example he offers is Gustave Flaubert) strives to be transparent, expressing "the reality of
the human world," it ends up by presenting the very opposite, that is, the "horror of existence deprived of the world" (Work 334) ("L'horreur de l'existence privée de monde" [La Part 335]). One might
surmise, quite legitimately, that Blanchot is here simply reiterating the view that language effaces the
world, and that words plunge things into negativity as soon as they speak these very things. Comforted by the universally accepted influence that Hegel's concept of language has had on Blanchot, one
could simply leave it at that and move on. Moreover, is it not Blanchot himself who, a little later in the
same essay, reminds us that "speech is the murder of existence" (Work 335) ("parole meurtrière de
l'existence" [La Part 337])? True, Blanchot refers here, however, to speech (parole), which operates in
the world of appearances, which is also the world of a conventionally understood literature, and a conventionally understood negativity. With subtle rhetorical ability, in the space of about two pages
Blanchot provides a condensed critique of the negativity of language, opening at the same time the
path for a conceptualization of the potentiality of language. These pages are dense and the argument
intricately interwoven. Care is needed to navigate them and separate the critique from the proposition, recombining them once more as Blanchot's project gradually emerges out of the page. If, on the
one hand, the negativity of language is predicated on a conventional understanding of language as
that which represents and speaks the non-linguistic, the potentiality of language is predicated on the
hypothesis of a world in which the difference between language and the non-linguistic becomes indeterminate. The latter, according to Blanchot, is a world "without existence."
Before we go any further, it is essential to emphasize that for Blanchot the notion of "existence
without being" is heralded by the completion of history (l'histoire achevée) and the coming to presence of a time and a space in which, "nature almost made human," "speech advances to meet the
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thing and the thing learns to speak" (Work 335) ("la parole vient au devant de la chose et la chose
apprend à parler" [La Part 337]). Blanchot hypostatizes a mode of language and existence which are
alternative to both the actuality of existence with being and to the negativity of literature as mimesis.
The complex and puzzling relation Blanchot draws between "existence without being" and poetry a
page earlier begins now to make sense: "This process is day which has become fatality, consciousness
whose light is no longer the lucidity of the vigil but the stupor of lack of sleep, it is existence without
being, as poetry tries to recapture it behind the meaning of words, which rejects it" (Work 334) ("la
poésie entend la ressaisir derrière le sens des mots qui la rejette" [La Part 336]; emphasis in the original). Literally speaking, Blanchot writes that poetry seeks to reconnect with a form of existence, some
characteristics of which are dim consciousness and stupor, which defies the instrumentality of language. "To recapture" means to possess again that which is no longer in possession, that which has
been separated from us. One of the reasons for this fracture might be ascribed to the ordinary understanding and experience of language. Blanchot could very well be proposing, in this sense, a return to
a pure and natural state when the distinctions between humans and nature were blurred, and when
culture and history had not yet driven a wedge in between men and life, organic as well as inorganic.
Gerald Bruns is right when he claims that Blanchot's concerns are ontological, but perhaps slightly
hasty when he assumes that, given the ontological context, language is marginal (Bruns 51-52). As
for Martin Heidegger, whose influence on Blanchot is well documented (Clark, Poetics; Savage; Keenan; Wolin; Ungar; Silverman; Clark, Derrida), language and ontology are inextricably linked in the
work of Maurice Blanchot. And yet, Blanchot's is a special kind of language, an appreciation of which
must pass via the interrogation of the meanings and implications of a life after the world. Recapture,
re-appropriate (ressaisir) may also be understood as a task to be undertaken by moving forward. It is,
in fact, in this sense that ressaisir is employed by Blanchot, since the life he intimates is clearly located at the end of history, not at history's beginning. It is, therefore, a matter of going ahead to meet
our destiny of being in the world rather than of being before the world. The terminology is deliberately
Heideggerian, and we will go back to Heidegger in a moment. What I wish to stress now is Blanchot's
articulation of a return achieved by going forward. In other words, Blanchot proposes to return where
we have never been, to a place, that is, that is familiar in its utter strangeness. What is this place, this
topos, which, paraphrasing the Italian poet Vittorio Sereni, "we know without knowing" ("sapendo di
non sapere") (Sereni 248)?
On 4 December 1937, in a famous lecture he delivered at the College of Sociology in Paris, Alexandre Kojève announced the end of history. He arrived at this philosophical conclusion through a close
reading of Hegel's Phenomenology in which he found clear and obvious indications pointing to a state
in which the distinction between subject and object, and between human and nature, would come to
an end. This moment, according to Kojève, will mark the apotheosis of universalizing principles and
thinking, and the final celebration of human history and culture the result of which, ironically, will determine the end of culture, history, and humanity as we know it (159). The similarities between
Kojève's analysis of history and Blanchot's semantics with regard to the "achievement" of history are
obvious. Through a long, deliberate, and hard-fought period in which humans will do everything they
can to define their identity and specificity in opposition to other forms of life, they will return to a form
of natural and primordial state of indistinction. It is to be assumed that this re-appropriation of being
in the world, rather than before the world, is the cause of a deliberate separation and estrangement,
and that its achievement will lead humans to move forward to where they had already-been. And yet,
this already-been is the unknown that lies behind history or, to be more precise, at the end of history.
Kojève's lecture had an enormous impact on French intellectuals, and especially on a close associate of Blanchot, Georges Bataille. Kojève's lecture on the end of history was published, together with
all the other lectures he delivered at the College of Sociology, in 1947 with the title Introduction à la
lecture de Hegel. A revised and extended version was published in 1968. The English translation, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, appeared in 1980. Bataille responded immediately to Kojève's hypothesis with a letter later published in Le coupable (English translation in Hollier). With the typical
blend of intensity and manic creativity so characteristic of Bataille's writing, he embraced most of what
Kojève had proposed, but with a strong reservation. Kojève had stated that "Man properly so-called"
will disappear and with him history and philosophy. What will remain indefinitely, he added, will be
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what "makes Man happy," that is, "art, love, play" (159). Bataille could not reconcile the disappearance of "Man" with the extant remnant of what "Man" had produced. What will be the form and use
through which the "rest" will continue to exist? (Bataille qtd. in Hollier 90). Bataille's question goes to
the very heart of humanity's action and production, teasing out the mysterious, and perhaps even sacred elements connoting art.
In opposition to what Kojève produced in the form of an answer to Bataille's letter nearly thirty
years after the original debate, that is, that art, love, play will become natural again with the disappearance of "Man so-called" — "Hence it would have to be admitted that after the end of History, men
would construct their edifices and works of art as birds build their nests and spiders spin their webs,
would perform musical concerts after the fashion of frogs and cicadas, would play like young animals,
and would indulge in love like adult beasts" (Kojève 159) — Bataille proposed that the remnant of
humanity after the end of history would be nothing other than an "unemployed negativity" (Bataille
qtd. in Hollier 90); a testimony without a story to testify to, a non-language, or rather, a language
which only speaks to itself, and for nobody else, the story of a return to the never-been. What kind of
place a life at the end of history might be was already, as we see, at the center of the dialogue between Bataille and Kojève. Blanchot, although not directly involved in this dialogue, partakes of it, and
responds to similar concerns throughout his work, providing his own answers to the question of what
might remain after the disappearance of "Man so-called."
Among the similarities marking Blanchot's perspectives and those produced by Kojève and Bataille
— the most important of which is the consensus on the beginning of the new world from the selfannihilating fulfillment of history — there are some obvious differences. While for Kojève and Bataille
the end of history determines the movement of humans toward nature, the opposite direction appears
to be the one entertained by Blanchot. We remember that Blanchot writes of a "nature almost made
human," and of a speech that "advances to meet the thing and the thing learns to speak." If this is
correct, the historical éschaton produced by humans brings about a reunion, which is also the stage on
which the differences between "Man" and nature are levelled and made indeterminate, but also on
which what remains of this separation speaks a language that can potentially still be acted upon, that
can still find uses. In other words, Blanchot distances himself at once from Kojève's naïve and elemental approach and from Bataille's "unemployed negativity." The ontological state that Blanchot announces is neither aesthetically savage (Kojève) nor aesthetically suspended in negativity (Bataille).
What is it then?
The neuter has been often cited as the symbol of Blanchot's "existence without being," and with
good reason (see e.g., Bruns 52). Blanchot himself writes of the neuter — The Space of Literature
(1982) (L'Espace littéraire [1955]) is almost entirely devoted to mapping the neuter — in ways that
leave little doubt regarding the significance of this indeterminate zone in which space, time, and language appear to have been snatched away from history and negativity, from chronos and kairós, and
from a determination that is entirely human. And yet, they are not entirely other. It is only that the
differences between negativity and instrumentality, chronos and kairós, are no longer evident. What is
important about this language, this time, and this space — which are not totally foreign and unknown,
and which, therefore, are not another language, and not another space and another time — is the
ways in which what remains might speak and act, and ultimately the ways in which it might be used.
That which remains must be understood here not as what is left of history or negativity, but precisely
as what remains after the moment at which humans and nature have come together, making differences and distinctions, even in relation to what is left of history and negativity, inapplicable and inoperative. Let us remember the metaphor of a space, a time, and a language where we have been by
never being there, or that which we know without knowing.
The biopolitical project embarked upon by Giorgio Agamben depends on the philosophical use of
this inoperativeness. We do not have the space here to elucidate the connections between Blanchot's
"existence without being" and contemporary biopolitics, especially Agamben's take on biopolitcs. It is
nonetheless apparent how Blanchot's, Bataille's, and Heidegger's thought is central to Agamben's
work, especially in relation to the topos of the threshold (The Open [2004], L'aperto [2002]; The Time
that Remains [2005], Il tempo che resta [2001]).
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The neuter might very well be the cipher for Blanchot's ontological and linguistic project, but it is
the interrogation of the considerable philosophical importance of the remnant that may shed further
and original lights on a project that, notwithstanding the enormous literature about it, continues to
challenge us. Martin Heidegger's thought and philosophy may be summarized as the attempt to think
an ontological state that grows out from the old, and that preserves the old by making it inapplicable
— in Heidegger's case, the old is Western metaphysics. This project remains operative throughout
Heidegger's opus, and connects periods of his writing that might otherwise appear unrelated or even
oppositional. Heidegger's main preoccupation is, in a sense, that of spying and investigating the experience of being in the state of throwness, in that zone, that is, that opens in between metaphysics and
pure essence. The facticity of Dasein is nothing other than the effort to bring to fruition the condition
of "worldliness" (Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe 56-57, 71-72). "Worldliness" must be understood here as
the ontological experience of being in the world, as opposed to being before the world. We start to
recognize concepts and concerns that clearly indicate the proximity of Heidegger's and Blanchot's
thought. According to Heidegger, Western metaphysical tradition places humans before the world,
conjuring up what he believes is a pernicious duality and opposition between subject and object, nature and "Man," and, ultimately, being and Being. In his phenomenological years Heidegger proclaimed the need to re-experience things as such rather than as concepts, and in his later writing he
returns again to the necessity to open oneself to things, to make oneself available to an experience of
mutual appropriation. This would result in what Heidegger calls, at times interchangeably, the "open"
or, borrowing the term from pre-Socratic philosophers, aletheia (truth, unconcealment). The main trait
of this new ontological experience — which as we shall see in a moment is inextricably linked to a new
experience of language — is the ability to act upon the ultimate potentiality, the final purpose of which
is the mutual appropriation of being and Being. In the open, metaphysical distinctions and oppositions
would be erased by rendering them inoperative through the conjunction of subject and object, nature
and "Man." This, according to Heidegger, might only be achieved at the end of metaphysics, that is, at
the moment of metaphysics' exhaustion — which is also its completion. If it is correct to presume a
similarity between the end of Western metaphysics and the end of Western history, the connection
between Heidegger's and Blanchot's projects appears immediate and unavoidable.
But there is something else that must be stressed at this point, and that will shed further light on
the distinctions between Blanchot's thought on the one hand, and Bataille's and Kojève's on the other.
For Heidegger, the experience of the "open," which introduces a further ontological plane, inevitably
excludes humans from the reified, and in a sense pre-arranged, potentialities available to them. This
would emancipate humans from their position of outsiders looking in and partaking of life as if it were
always already removed, detached from them. And yet, this process of assimilation does not entail the
renunciation and destruction of humanity (as in Kojève), it instead implies a mutual appropriation that
maintains relevant specificity but renders them inapplicable. Moreover, life in the open is guided by
the ultimate potentiality that acts upon what remains (the mutual appropriation of being and Being in
Heidegger, and of nature and humans in Blanchot), and that actively uses what is left in order to turn
potentiality (dynamis) into actuality (energeia). Therefore, there is no negativity without use, as in
Bataille. What is left is productive tension, which might be described as a modality of language and
being, activated through the relation of what is made inoperative.
It is in this sense that references to destruction must be understood in Heidegger (What is Philosophy? 71-72). As he himself emphasizes, destruction means to demolish not to destroy ("Destruktion
bedeutet nicht Zerstören, sondern Abbauen, Abtragen," What is Philosophy? 72). A new building is
erected by using what is left, the remnants of the old, and combining the old with other materials. Life
in the open is this construction in which old and new, sameness and difference become indeterminable. And yet, the existence of this construction, its very being — this must be stressed — is predicated
upon the very use (messa in opera) of what remains. Suspension, waiting, oblivion, the neuter are the
central words and concepts that lead Blanchot in his investigation of "existence without being" (on
suspension in Blanchot see also Bartoloni). They all allude to a break, a caesura, a pause, and to a
condition that might bring about the movement of mutual appropriation, and an experience of language and being which, having rendered ordinary language and being inoperative, initiate a movement of exploration in the gap between negativity and appearances in the attempt, perhaps, to catch
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the world rather than the "horror" of its disappearance. It might seem ironic that in order to exist in
the world, to be in the world, one should choose an "existence without being." But, as should be clear
by now, this expression cannot be interpreted literally. It can start to make sense only if we understand it as "existence without historical and/or metaphysical being."
It is clear — as Bruns noted — that the works of Franz Kafka provide Blanchot with a model and
an articulation of the neuter. Blanchot goes back to Kafka's writing time and again, finding in it those
literary and philosophical elements, the furniture and the vocabulary, of an experience that speaks
directly to, but also in the context of, a suspended zone where the world of conventions and its eschatological counterpart are momentarily halted. Kafka brings to the surface a possible gap, and presents
it before our eyes. And yet, Kafka's neuter does not appear to have a redemptive use, and perhaps
indeed no use at all, apart from suggesting that any hope of redemption that might be harbored by us
is destined to be dashed. Kafka has been often quoted to have claimed, in a conversation with his
friend Max Brod, that there is endless hope, only not for us ("unendlich viel Hoffnung —, nur nicht für
uns," qtd. in Brod 75). Kafka's assertion must be understood within a particular articulation of
messianism, and Kafka's belief that the arrival of the Messiah will be inevitably deferred until after our
disappearance. The key to Kafka's remark, and its possible meaning, is to be looked for in the pronoun
"us" (uns). What is it that Kafka meant by "us"? Was he referring to himself, to his generation, to human beings? Was he perhaps saying that the end of history and the arrival of the Messiah will coincide
with the destruction of humanity? And assuming that the latter is correct, who or what would be the
beneficiary of the remaining hope?
Blanchot embraces the idea of the neuter, but he then does something with it, which is simultaneously against Kafka and for Kafka. I believe that Blanchot empties the neuter of the messianic aura
and plunges it into a state in which hope, therefore, is no longer relevant or meaningful. Blanchot's
language and ontological project take us into a world of oblivion and waiting (L'attente l'oubli) in which
what we were has been forgotten and what we will become is produced — as we wait without hope,
and therefore for nothing or no one in particular — by incessantly putting to use the ultimate potentiality that we have become. Blanchot, I claim, is against Kafka because he deprives the world of the
missing Messiah — which could also mean that Blanchot presents a world in the presence of the Messiah (for a discussion of Blanchot and religion see Hart) — who is so central to Kafka's cosmology; he
is for Kafka — or perhaps he aids Kafka — by presenting a state of life to which Kafka might have referred without himself venturing into. In Blanchot, oblivion does not equate with the disappearance of
the past, with past's annihilation and destruction. It means instead to preserve the past as the preeminent missing thing. What we miss remains with us, permeates our actions and thoughts. By the
same token, it remains out of reach and sight, invisible, undisclosable and unutterable. Blanchot's
oblivion is, in this sense, strongly connected to Heidegger's destruction. They both imply a process of
production in which the past — tradition, the known, the conventional — is amissed (indistinguishable)
due to varying degrees of mutual appropriation (past and present, history and the end of history,
metaphysics and the end of metaphysics, "Man" and nature). What is left is a language — and a life —
that speaks through the remains of language — an oblivious language.
We recall Heidegger's emphasis on "learning renunciation" as the necessary path towards a new
experience of language and being in his lectures later colleted in the volume On the Way to Language.
It is especially in the lecture on Georg Trakl's poem "The Word" ("Das Wort"), that Heidegger insists
on the philosophical significance of learning renunciation. The poet — and the philosopher — must
learn renunciation in order to attain a new perspective on the world, in order to be in the world. Put
simply, Heidegger invites us to renounce our tendency to negate, deface, hide the world behind language. As an alternative to the language and the world of negativity, he suggests that we allow language and the world to come towards each other, to meet and become indistinguishable. But in order
to achieve this we must renounce, we must accept oblivion (On the Way 143). The question that
needs to be asked now is the following: "is the acceptance of oblivion or, with Heidegger, the process
of learning renunciation, the cause or the result of the end of history?" In other words, where are we
now, in history or outside history, in oblivion or with one foot rooted in conventions? Are we living or
waiting? And if we are waiting, is this a passive or active waiting? In other words, what is left for us to
think, and more importantly, what is this that is left, that remains? Blanchot and Heidegger articulated
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and expounded the ontology at the end of metaphysics and at the end of history, but they themselves
perhaps never thought to be over the threshold, to be on the other side. One might say that their
work indicates the way, the path to choose, and that maybe some of their more daring writing ends
up somewhere different, or at least ends up inhabiting the threshold. One simple answer to these
questions is that we rarely know where we are.
Where are we, for instance, when we watch the last seven minutes of Michelangelo Antonioni's
film The Eclipse (L'eclisse)? The literature on Antonioni's work is vast and insights into L'eclisse are
many (see Arrowsmith; Brunette; Chatman; Rohdie; Rifkin). The significance of the urban space as an
emblem of human malaise and confusion is rightly stressed. There is no doubt that Antonioni is one of
the most "architectural" directors of Italian cinema. And this is not only exemplified in L'eclisse but
also in his other urban masterpiece, Red Desert (Il deserto rosso). What is disconcerting, however, is
that most of the discussion on Antonioni's film pays little attention to the centrality that suspension
plays in his work, and no attempt is made to link suspension to the debates that, as we have seen,
are so vital in the context of a relevant section of modern and contemporary philosophy and literature.
L'eclisse is set in the Rome of the late 1950s, and presents the story of a young woman (played by
Monica Vitti) coming to terms with her complex identity which is tested against and reflected into a
series of relationships with men. The film begins with the breaking of one of these relationships, and
continues as a new one, with a young stockbroker (played by Alain Delon), unfolds. But the main
characters of the movie are not so much the people on screen as their unseen tensions and potentialities; the possibilities that, always implicit, remain, like haloes, unspeakable, operating toward something that appears to defy completion. One might say that in L'eclisse Antonioni attempts to film what
lies behind the image, that life, that is, which is produced through the interchange of actuality and
negativity.
Antonioni offers continuous views of urban spaces as a further emblem of this parallel existence.
But these are not the spaces of classical, Renaissance or baroque Rome, but modern areas in the suburbs, recently built or still under construction. We might describe them as anonymous spaces, if we
agree that anonymous is meant here as that which does not have a name, and therefore a visible
identity. It is in this sense that the Rome of Antonioni's suburbs provides simultaneously the image
that remains always already invisible next to the historical and cultural actuality of the eternal city,
and an allegory, if not perhaps the background, of an existence without being. This is especially true
in the last seven enigmatic and ambiguous minutes of the film where the camera abandons the actual
characters to focus and present, unmediated, sequence after sequence of urban landscape, halffinished buildings, lamp posts, anonymous pedestrians, in other words, existences without history.
What is it that we are watching? Are we still witnessing a series of unfolding potentialities related to
the stories of the main characters and/or, perhaps, what remains of these stories as they move towards the unseen existence that they are?
What is certainly interesting, and directly linked to the preoccupations of this article, is that in these seven minutes human and non-human blend together, and history and non-history disappear into
each other. We literally watch what is left after the end of the "existence with being." It might very
well be that what we look at at the end of Antonioni's L'eclisse is an example of the potential space,
the potential language and the potential being seen as one shifts attention from the pure, but also
concealed and negative, category of origin and the active, but also already consumed, experience of
existence, to the productive potentiality of life in the making, that is the becoming of existence and
life. What's extraordinary about these muted, lingering scenes of half-finished buildings is, using a
Heideggerian phrase, "the ringing stillness" (On the Way 108) of their voices, those echoes of life that
surround these buildings and that invite us to sharpen our auditory senses to capture the noise of the
now, the before, and the after. The power of life, its plentifulness, is celebrated here by revealing it
through its very raw production. We are watching life, and the reason we are so puzzled is because
we're watching life in what appears to be the absence of intention and purpose. Or rather, we're annoyed and yet mesmerized because we are in the presence of life in the making as opposed to life in
action. The last sequences of L'eclisse are baffling because they introduce a new tone, a new narrative
into the usual narrative of day-to-day life. In being so unexpected, so unusual, this language jolts the
viewer because it provides a new grammar for the presentation of life. Indeed it presents a new —
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renewed — life as opposed to the one presented according to a series of accepted rules and conventions. But, precisely because of this, this life becomes all of a sudden more alive, more pulsating than
the crystallized appearances which we are so used to. But also because of its overpowering liveliness,
this life might induce scandal, indignation. It might, however, propel the viewer into a new dimension
that demands to be discovered and thought. In viewing the last few minutes of L'eclisse one understands better what Heidegger might have meant by the "open."
Antonioni's cinema does not communicate so much the end of the "human soul" as its indistinction
in the space and time of potentiality, that space in which the "human soul" enacts its power to be as
"not-not-being." The power to be as "not-not-being" is the power of life to conceal its common beingthere, which doesn't mean to not exist, but, more simply, to exist differently.
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